



Democratisation in Tanzania: Re-examining citizens' preferences for political party systems after 1992

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Executive summary

A multiparty system is one of the main features of democracy. This system means that in a country there are different political parties with different ideologies and perspectives, which periodically compete through credible elections to run the government. It provides freedom to citizens to choose different ideologies and perspectives to realise their well-being. Tanzania adopted it before she became independent in 1961, but it was discontinued in 1965. After a hot debate on the restoration of such a system, the government re-adopted it despite the choice of many consulted Tanzanians to continue with a single-party system. After the re-adoption of such a system, it is not clearly understood whether that preference has changed.

This research re-examines the preferences of party systems after 1992 and the predictors of preference for pluralism during 2001 - 2022. Data from all Rounds of the Afrobarometer Survey were used to answer specific research questions.

The results indicate that a majority of respondents prefer pluralism to a single-party system. Male and urban-based respondents are more likely to accept a multiparty system than female and rural-based respondents. Further, more educated respondents and those identifying more closely with opposition parties were more likely to prefer pluralism than their lesser educated compatriots as well as those closer to the ruling party, CCM. The analysis also shows that most respondents believe that political party competition increases the likelihood of political violence. Some respondents had a view that pluralism divided people, and the proportion was the highest in 2005, but it was below 50% and was increasingly dropping. It is possible that during 2005, the political tension was high, but this is an area for further research. Furthermore, respondents who said a multiparty system divided society were over four times less likely to choose pluralism than those who saw it as necessary. Further analysis indicated that a simple majority of respondents were happy to live close to people who supported different political parties, and one in five did not care about it.

Further, the majority of respondents trusted political parties. Of these respondents, some (59%) trusted both CCM and the opposition parties combined, while a third of respondents trusted CCM only, and one in ten trusted the opposition only.

The findings suggest an evolution of popular views on multipartism over time in contrast to reservations expressed to Justice Nyalali's Commission in 1991. It is possible that, over time, many citizens have grown to prefer pluralism to a single party system because the speculated violence and societal division have not occurred. Also, they trust both CCM and the opposition political parties. Formal education has contributed to the increase of number of citizens re-accepting pluralism. Urban areas also did the same because the opposition political parties are more present in that area than in rural places.

As in Tanzania, multiparty democracy is constitutional and it is well-argued that it is a better government system than authoritarianism, all key stakeholders should play their role in democratisation. The main stakeholders are the central and local government, electoral management bodies, and political parties. Based on the findings of this research, the following actions are required to increase the pace of the democratisation process in the country:

- The central government should put more emphasis on teaching democracy at all levels of formal education,

- In collaboration with the media institutions, it should also increase radio and TV programmes on democracy to educate the public about this government system,
- Electoral commissions should improve the management of the entire electoral process to reduce irregularities, which sometimes lead to violence,
- All political parties should avoid undue influence during local and general elections,
- The opposition political parties should increase their permanent presence in the rural areas as CCM does,
- CCM should educate people close to it about multiparty democracy.

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All efforts were made to make this report error-free, but it is not guaranteed that it is free from mistakes. All those who supported this work are not responsible for any errors and the views presented in this report.

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Introduction

Many nations have included democratic features in their constitutions (United Nations, 2014), but the democracy adoption rate varies across them and time (Gunitsky, 2018). For example, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, there are full and flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and autocratic states (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2023). Alternatively, according to Freedom House, there are free, partial, and not free nations (Freedom House, 2021). In this case, democracy is the form of government whereby as many well-informed citizens as possible participate in decision-making processes. International organisations and communities like the United Nations promote democracy (Morse, 2019). Also, powerful nations such as the United States of America (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and Scandinavian countries promote it (Morse, 2019). It is believed and evident that in democracies, the majority of people have better lives than in authoritarian states, but it is not a panacea (Dahl, 2017).

Multipartyism is one of the critical elements of democracy, and Tanzania adopted it about a decade before independence, but discontinued it in the mid-1960s (Brennan, 2005; Maguire, 1969; United Republic of Tanzania, 1965). It was re-adopted in 1992 and until 2020, six general elections were held (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020). In all the elections, CCM won the presidency and the majority of parliamentary and councillorship seats (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020). However, except for the 2020 general elections, some opposition parties had increased the winning seats (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2016, 2021). In all these elections, there were complaints about their credibility (Baraza la Maaskofu Katoliki Tanzania [Tanzania Episcopal Conference], 2018; Legal and Human Rights Centre & Zanzibar Legal Services Centre, 2023).

Before the re-adoption of this system, there was a heated debate on whether to restore it (Mkapa, 2019; Mwinyi, 2020; Ulimwengu, 2021). CCM had several meetings at different levels and most members rejected the proposal to re-introduce it (Mkapa, 2019; Mwinyi, 2020; Ulimwengu, 2021). Similarly, the government consulted citizens, and the majority (77%) were also against multipartyism (United Republic of Tanzania, 1992). Despite the rejection of the proposition by many CCM members and citizens, the government re-adopted pluralism because of the poor socio-economic situation (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 1996; United Republic of Tanzania, 1992) and external pressure (United Republic of Tanzania, 1992; Whitehead, 2000). Since then, although some citizens voted for the opposition (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 1996; United Republic of Tanzania, 2006, 2016), it is not clearly and precisely known whether the preference of the majority of citizens of the party system in 1991 has changed over the period.

The purpose of this research is to re-examine the rate of re-acceptance of pluralism and its predictors during 2001 – 2022. All Afrobarometer Rounds data were analysed to answer specific research questions posed in the theoretical and conceptual framework sub-section. The analysis was guided by the Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) theory.

The report is organised as follows: front and back matters, introduction, Tanzania profile, literature review, methodology, results, discussion, and conclusions and recommendations.

Tanzania profile

Tanzania is a republic one-nation-state founded in 1961 after attaining its independence. It is the union of two republic states – Tanzania Mainland, formerly the Republic of Tanganyika, and Tanzania Zanzibar, formerly the People’s Republic of Zanzibar (United Republic of Tanzania, 1965, 2005). Tanzania Zanzibar is semi-autonomous (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). In other words, the nation has two governments, which are the Union and the Zanzibar government (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). The union government also caters for Tanzania Mainland (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). Additionally, the United Republic of Tanzania is a secular state (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005).

The government system comprises three organs which are the executive, judiciary, and parliament to ensure checks and balances (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). The executive ensures all citizens prosper, while the judiciary takes care of justice and interprets laws (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). Again, the parliament oversees, advises the government, and enacts laws (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). The parliament consists of the president and national assembly (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). Again, the national assembly comprises the elected members of parliament (MPs), presidential-appointed MPs, women special seat MPs, Zanzibar representative MPs, and an attorney general who is ex-officio (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2021). Tanzania Zanzibar also has an executive, judiciary, and parliament, which is known as the House of Representatives (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). The highest court of law in the union is the Court of Appeal (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). The executive, which is also called the government, has two levels – the central and local government (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005).

Furthermore, the government has a cabinet of ministers, including the prime minister or chief minister, in the case of Zanzibar, sectoral ministries, departments, and agencies (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). There are also many civil society organisations (CSOs), including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at the national, regional, and community levels (Lange, Wallevik, & Kiondo, 2000). In simple terms, a civil society is the space between the individual citizen and the state (Lange et al., 2000). The government regulates and interacts with them to make the nation a better place to live (Lange et al., 2000). For example, some CSOs work on economic development, poverty alleviation, gender, children, education, health, capacity building, environment, legal and human rights, agriculture, social and culture, religion, and what have you (National Council of NGOs, 2023). Examples of CSOs are HakiElimu, Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), Tunza Mazingira Ondoa Umasikini in English, Conserve the Environment, Fight Poverty, Youth Farm Tanzania, and many more (National Council of NGOs, 2023).

Tanzania is politically peaceful, but during elections, the political tension is heightened (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019; Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2001; Legal and Human Rights Centre & Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation, 2016). Also, the government has lifted the ban on political rallies (Legal and Human Rights Centre & Zanzibar Legal Services Centre, 2023). It combines autocracy and democracy (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2023). By 01 March 2023, there were 19 political parties with permanent registration (United Republic of Tanzania, 2017a). The parties are Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in English, Revolutionary Party, the Civic United Front (CUF), and Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) in English, Democracy and Development Party (United Republic of Tanzania, 2017a). Others are the Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD), National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi), National League for Democracy (NLD), United People’s Democratic Party (UPDP), and National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA) (United Republic of Tanzania, 2017a). In the list, there are also African Democratic Alliance Party (ADA-TADEA),

(UDP), Chama Cha Demokrasia Makini (MAKINI), Democratic Party (DP), SAUTI ya Umma (SAU) (United Republic of Tanzania, 2017a). Alliance for African Farmers Party (AAFP), Chama Cha Kijamii (CCK), Alliance for Democratic Change (ADC), and Chama Cha Ukombozi wa Umma (CHAUMMA) are also on the list (United Republic of Tanzania, 2017a). Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT – Wazalendo) is also a political party in Tanzania (United Republic of Tanzania, 2017a).

Tanzania conducts local and general elections every five years (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2021). Voters are normally registered before the elections. For example, for the general elections, every citizen aged 18 years and above is eligible to vote, but they should be registered in the permanent national voter's register (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2021). The general elections are for the presidency, parliamentarians, and councillors (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2021). The register is updated twice in five years; that is, the period between two general elections (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2021).

The register update involves updating voter information, and registering new voters (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2021). In the 2000, 2015, and 2020 general elections, there were about 10m, 23, and 29m registered voters (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2001, 2021). During the elections, voters were educated about elections through various ways such as mass media, social media, meetings, exhibitions, drama, Civil Society Organisations, publications, banners, and many more (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2021). Despite the provision of voter education, some voters did not vote, for example, in the 2020 general elections, only half of the registered voters (50.7%) voted (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2021). The turnout was low because some registered voters wanted the voter's card for other identification purposes, while others were apathetic, did not trust candidates, elected leaders did not deliver, and the like (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2021).

According to the general population census conducted in 2022, Tanzania has a population of 61 million people (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2022). Of these, 97% live in Tanzania Mainland (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2022). There are slightly more women (51%) than men (49%) (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2022). On average, between 2012 and 2022, the population growth rate hovered at 3% (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2022). It is also projected that by 2044 the population will double (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2022).

Socio-economic development covers the economy, health, and education status. In July 2020, Tanzania graduated from the low-income to the lower middle-income band (World Bank, 2021). During July - September 2022, the Gross Domestic Growth (GDP) was 5.2%, and the GDP was TZS 42.9 trillion (National Bureau of Statistics, 2022). The basic needs poverty rate also dropped from 28% in 2011/12 to 26% in 2017/18, while the food poverty rate dropped from 10% in 2011/12 to 8% in 2017/18 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020).

According to the 2022 Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey, between 1999-2022, early childhood mortality rates have significantly dropped, especially the under 5 and infant mortality rates (United Republic of Tanzania, 2023). Early childhood includes neonatal, infant, and under 5 (United Republic of Tanzania, 2023).

Further, the Early Childhood Development Index 2030 showed that nearly half of children aged 24-59 months met the indicators in terms of health, learning, and psychosocial well-being (United Republic of Tanzania, 2023). The survey also showed that between 1999 and 2022, child nutritional status has improved, especially the stunted rate dropped from 48% to 30% (United Republic of Tanzania, 2023). The wasted and underweight have generally remained constant (United Republic of Tanzania, 2023).

Since independence, Tanzania has strived to educate all its citizens. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2020), about one in five people aged 15 and above years has not gone to school. The situation is worse in rural areas than in urban settings (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020). Half of people have primary education, while close to one-fifth have an ordinary level of secondary education (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020). Only a very few have attained university or diploma education (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020).

Similarly, three in four Tanzanians aged 15 years and above are literate, while one in five is illiterate (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020). Literacy means the ability to read and write a short or simple statement in either Kiswahili, English, or both languages (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020). Of the literate, there were more men than women (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020). A simple majority of people used Kiswahili, while very few used English (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020).

Democracy features and diffusion

As defined earlier, democracy is a form of government that involves as many informed people as possible in decision-making processes (Addink, 2019; Democratic Practices, 2011; Peonidis, 2011; Setala, 2009; Urbinati, 2008). In other words, it is a form of government whereby all people willingly govern themselves either directly or indirectly (Addink, 2019; Correa-Lopera, 2019). Direct democracy means all citizens take part in decision-making processes to fulfil their interests (Addink, 2019; Correa-Lopera, 2019), while representative democracy means all citizens make decisions through their elected representatives (Addink, 2019; Correa-Lopera, 2019; Setala, 2009; Urbinati, 2008). An example of direct democracy, in the modern era, is a referendum (Addink, 2019; Democratic Practices, 2011; Setala, 2009). The role of the elected representatives is to serve the universal interest (Msekwa, 2000; Muchler & Schmidt, 2020). Because human beings tend to be selfish, the elected representatives may serve only their interests or the interests of a few citizens (Msekwa, 2000; Mukandala, 2004; Peonidis, 2011).

Although the term democracy is contested (Addink, 2019; Democratic Practices, 2011; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019), it has various features such as freedom (Csaky, 2020), equality, deliberation (Setala, 2009), elections, rule of law, protection of rights, participation, transparency (Addink, 2019), accountability (Csaky, 2020), responsiveness (Setala, 2009), and pluralism (Csaky, 2020). Freedom further entails free press, speech (Addink, 2019), and assembly (Bentham, 1968, as cited in Peonidis, 2011). The democratic election is competitive, regular, free, and fair (Addink, 2019; Freedom House, 2020); and it is conducted through a secret ballot (Bentham, 1968, as cited in Peonidis, 2011) and involves universal suffrage (Freedom House, 2020; Peonidis, 2011). Moreover, every citizen and election contestant should agree on the election legislation and respect the results if the election is credible (Nyong'o, 2009). Although individual people can vie for a political position through independent candidacy, political party sponsorship is widely practised, and there must be more than one political party competing in the election (Muchler & Schmidt, 2020).

Democracy has been diffusing and adopted in different nations and times (Gunitsky, 2018). However, some nations adopted it fully, others did it partially, and others like Tanzania adopted it, discontinued it (Gunitsky, 2018), and re-adopted it (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020). These diffusions of democracy in different periods and geographical areas are called democratic waves (Gunitsky, 2018). The democratic wave is a cluster of linked transitions of government systems from non-democracy to democracy in a particular time, place, and speed, and it surpasses the transitions to authoritarian regimes (Gunitsky, 2018). There are two dimensions of the democratic wave, which are the origin and time (Gunitsky, 2018). The origin comprises vertical external influences such as a change of international order and horizontal constitutes a spread across the network of countries because of domestic factors in the origin (Gunitsky, 2018). The other dimension means the spread can take either a short or long time; that is, contagion or emulation respectively (Gunitsky, 2018).

In the past 200 years, there have been waves of democracy diffusion because of various factors such as international and national political, social, and economic pressures (Gunitsky, 2018). According to Table 1, there have been 13 waves in different years and regions.

Sub-Saharan Africa region, which includes Tanzania, experienced democratic waves twice - during the decolonisation era and after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (Gunitsky, 2018).

Table 1. Waves of Democracy in the Past Two Centuries

Wave	Year(s)	Region/ Nation
The Atlantic	1776 – 1798	North America and parts of Europe
Latin American wars of independence	1809 – 1824	Latin America
The first constitutional	1820 – 1821	Southern Europe
The Romantic – Nationalist	1830 – 1831	Central, and Western Europe
The Spring of Nations	1848	Central, and Western Europe
The second constitutional	1905 – 1912	Non-regional
The post-WWI	1919 – 1922	Eastern and Central Europe
The post-WWII	1945 – 1950	Western Europe Japan, and Latin America
The African decolonisation	1956 – 1968	Sub-Saharan Africa
The modernisation	1974 – 1988	Southern Europe, Latin America, Asia
The post-Soviet collapse	1989 – 1994	Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Republics, Africa
The colour revolutions	2000 – 2007	Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Republics
The Arab Spring	2011 – 2012	North Africa Middle East

Source: Adapted from Seva Gunitsky, 2018, pp. 638-639

In the 1960s, the United Nations began to promote democracy because it is highly related to a high degree of well-being (United Nations Development Fund, 2002). Currently, nearly all members of the UN have included democratic elements in their constitutions (United Nations, 2014), but the challenge for some of them is to practice them (Gunitsky, 2018). Likewise, the Western development partners, including international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund include democracy as a condition for development support (Gunitsky, 2018). However, the rise of China may make that condition redundant (Mohan, 2014) because she does not cherish democracy (Gunitsky, 2018; Mohan, 2014). Some regional organisations also encourage the adoption of democracy among their member states (Gunitsky, 2018).

Multipartyism is one of the pillars of democracy (Kiondo, 2001; Muchler & Schmidt, 2020), and the main goal of political parties is to run the government (Gaffney, 1996). Political parties are defined as organised expressions of divisions in society, and they sometimes cooperate to influence a political process and form a coalition government (Gaffney, 1996). According to the history of political processes in the UK and US, especially between the 17th and 18th century, political parties emerged. Political parties evolved from factions, polarised groups, expansion of suffrage, and institutionalisation of such organisations, for example, nominating candidates for the elections (Hoadley, 1986). As naturally people have different and similar opinions, personalities, and interests, different groups were formed to participate in political life (Hoadley, 1986). For example, in the UK, some members of the House of Commons opposed the Monarchy the thing which led to the formation of the Whigs and Tories (Loewenstein, 1967, as cited in Hoadley, 1986).

Over time these political groups became the modern political parties to serve the national interests (Chhibber & Kollman, 2004; Hoadley, 1986). In other words, they oppose the parties which form government, while remaining loyal to the constitution and nation (Hoadley, 1986).

Similarly, in the British Colonies, including the US, the assemblies of colonials started to oppose the Royal governors (Main, 1973, as cited in Hoadley, 1986). After the US independence, conflicts arose in the government and Congress due to personalities and other issues related to economic and foreign policies (Hoadley, 1986). Such political differences led to the formation of the coalition, which later became political parties (Chhibber & Kollman, 2004; Hoadley, 1986). For example, the Federalist Party was established but later declined (Chhibber & Kollman, 2004; Hoadley, 1986).

The main functions of the political parties are to promote citizen participation in political life (Elischer, 2013; Fionna, 2013; Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020; Kiondo, 2001; Morse, 2019; Muchler & Schmidt, 2020) and to shape public opinion (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020; Morse, 2019; Muchler & Schmidt, 2020). Other responsibilities are to link the public and the government (Elischer, 2013; Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020; Kiondo, 2001; Morse, 2019; Muchler & Schmidt, 2020; Nyerere, 1973), to aggregate the interests of citizens, and to determine the political content such as policies (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020; Kiondo, 2001; Morse, 2019; Muchler & Schmidt, 2020). Moreover, they are required to mobilise voters, integrate members and the electorate, represent citizens (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020; Morse, 2019; Muchler & Schmidt, 2020), and train and prepare leaders (Elischer, 2013; Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020; Kiondo, 2001).

Public trust in political parties is critical for such political institutions to function properly (Carlin, 2014; Dodsworth & Cheeseman, 2020). As trust in political parties is related to their trustworthiness, the dimensions of trustworthiness are integrity, competence, and responsiveness (Carlin, 2014). For example, they are supposed to be institutionalised, socially committed, and make decisions autonomously (Carlin, 2014; Morse, 2019). They should also have enough members from various parts of the nation, and practise democracy internally (Morse, 2019). They are also supposed to be corrupt-free and serve the interest of the public (Carlin, 2014; Dodsworth & Cheeseman, 2020).

Multiparty democracy adoption and re-adoption in Tanzania

Multiparty democracy was adopted in the 1950s (Ewald, 2011; Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020), discontinued in 1965 (United Republic of Tanzania, 1965), and re-adopted in 1992 (Ewald, 2011; Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020). It was introduced in Tanzania by the British colonials and the general elections were conducted before the independence of Tanzania Mainland, formerly Tanganyika, and Tanzania Zanzibar (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020). The Republic of Tanganyika and the Republic of the People of Zanzibar united on 26 April 1964 and became the United Republic of Tanzania (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020; United Republic of Tanzania, 1965). Before the independence, in Tanzania Mainland, political parties were Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), United Tanganyika Party (UTP), African National Congress (ANC), All Muslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT) (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020; United Republic of Tanzania, 1992). In Zanzibar, the political parties were 'Hizbul – Watan', in English lovers of their nation, Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), African Shiraz Party (ASP), Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) (Mwinyi, 2020), and UMMA Party (United Republic of Tanzania, 1992). ASP was formed after uniting the Shiraz Association and the African Association (Mwinyi, 2020). After the independence of Tanganyika, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020; Maguire, 1969) and the People's Convention Party (PCP) (Brennan, 2005; Maguire, 1969) were formed.

Before the independence, the general elections in Tanganyika were held in 1958, 1959, and 1960 (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020). During all elections, TANU won almost all the parliamentary seats (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020). In the third election, one seat was won by an independent candidate, Hermann Sarwatt, whose TANU membership was terminated before the elections (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020). In 1961, Tanganyika was granted independence and adopted the Westminster Parliamentary model (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020).

In 1963, TANU passed the resolution to change a democratic multiparty system to a democratic one-party system (Nyerere, 1968; United Republic of Tanzania, 1965). Following that resolution, in July 1965, the establishment of a democratic one-party state was effected, and the only political party was TANU (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020; Nyerere, 1968; Pratt, 1976). The main argument for this change was that TANU was supported by most people (Nyerere, 1968; United Republic of Tanzania, 1965) because the party had good political principles (Nyerere, 1968). The main principle was to bring democracy to the nation, which in turn, established independence of the nation and opportunity for people to determine and control their development (Nyerere, 1968).

The evidence for people's support was TANU's landslide victories in three consecutive general elections (Nyerere, 1968). Moreover, all candidates supported by TANU were automatically elected (Nyerere, 1968). Even the independent candidate won the parliamentary seat because he was a TANU member (Nyerere, 1968). It is further argued that the pluralism did not give people a choice among TANU candidates the thing which could threaten democracy and unity (Nyerere, 1968) but for presidency, only one candidate (United Republic of Tanzania, 1965). Karume and Kilimwiko (2020) do not support that evidence because citizens were not consulted on this political change (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020) as it was done in 1991 (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020; Mwinyi, 2020). Also, some citizens had different political ideological orientations (United Republic of Tanzania, 1965). In Zanzibar, ASP became the only political party after the revolution in January 1964 (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006).

Tanzania re-adopted the multiparty system in 1992 after a heated debate within CCM and citizen consultation (Karume & Kilimwiko, 2020; Mgumia, 2009; Mkapa, 2019; Mwinyi, 2020). The factors that contributed to the acceptance of pluralism again were nationally and internationally orientated (Aminzade, 2013; United Republic of Tanzania, 1992). Nationally, the economy was collapsing because public enterprises were not performing and living conditions were very bad (Aminzade, 2013; United Republic of Tanzania, 1992). The governance became very poor, for example, corruption was rampant, and the quality of social services like health and education was worse (Mwinyi, 2020). Above all, by then Tanzania was a low-income country and one of the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) (Aminzade, 2013). Because of these big problems, hot political debates about improving the lives of people were conducted within and outside the parliament (Aminzade, 2013; United Republic of Tanzania, 1992).

Internationally, although Tanzania was a member of the non-alignment movement, Eastern Europe and Asia countries like Romania, the USSR, and China were her big political role models (Mwinyi, 2020). Moreover, the political parties of those countries had strong friendship ties with CCM, and they cherished a single-party system (Mwinyi, 2020). When the USSR collapsed, and the Berlin Wall fell, most governments of Eastern Europe also collapsed and sent a shock wave to Tanzania (Mwinyi, 2020). The collapse of those governments was chaotic as they were mainly toppled off by the citizens (Mwinyi, 2020). The shock wave intensified the political debate about political change within the country (Mkapa, 2019; Mwinyi, 2020).

During the same time, the developed countries stopped lending funds to the HIPC until they formulated good strategies to build their economies and repay loans (Aminzade, 2013). Those developed countries asked the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to help the HIPC formulate poverty reduction and development plans, including regaining the capacity to pay their loans. Those financial institutions advised Tanzania to adopt liberalisation policies (Aminzade, 2013).

In 1991, the former President, Alhaji Ali Hassan Mwinyi, formed the Nyalali Commission to involve citizens in the decision-making process (Mwinyi, 2020). The Presidential Commission submitted the views of the people and recommendations (Mwinyi, 2020). In the same year, the parliament passed the decision to change the political system from a single to a multiparty democracy (Mwinyi, 2020). Although most citizens (77%) who participated in the consultation wanted to continue with the single-party system. Even a year before citizens' consultation, a survey conducted by Baregu and Mushi (1994) as cited in Bakari and Whitehead (2013, p. 99) revealed that about two-thirds of citizens (69%) wanted to continue with a single-party system. Generally, the reason for preferring to continue with a single-party system was the fear of national divisions and unrest (Aminzade, 2013; Quigley, 1992) which would persist (United Republic of Tanzania, 1992, p. 78). Specifically, the reasons were: that proponents for political pluralism were power and wanted to be rich; there would be racism, discrimination, and anarchy; and it would affect the Union (United Republic of Tanzania, 1992, p. 78). Others were it would slow development, equality and people's rights would be denied; it would cause neo-colonialism; and it was imposed from outside (United Republic of Tanzania, 1992, p. 78). Similarly, it was supported mainly by the educated; and it would increase burden to taxpayers (United Republic of Tanzania, 1992, p. 78). Despite such arguments, the government embraced the change peacefully (Mwinyi, 2020).

The government restored multipartyism because of the interaction between external influence and domestic pressures, and on the advice of the late Mwalimu Nyerere, the first president, who argued that Tanzania was mature enough for pluralism (Aminzade, 2013). In other words, it was not inevitable and if delayed, its consequences could be devastating (Mkapa, 2019; Mwinyi, 2020) because of mass mobilisation and contention as in some role models in Eastern Europe (Gunitsky, 2018). However, the late Mwalimu Nyerere cautioned that the political parties should have a national scope to maintain national unity (Aminzade, 2013).

From 1992, political parties were registered and deregistered, and until March 2023, there were 19 political parties (United Republic of Tanzania, 2017a). In 1992, there was one registered political party, CCM, and in 1993, many more were registered, including CUF and CHADEMA, while between 2001 and 2014, eight were registered (United Republic of Tanzania, 2017a). It seems Jahazi Asilia, Popular National Party (PONA), Haki na Ustawi (CHAUSTA), and Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) were deregistered (United Republic of Tanzania, 2017b).

Since the first general elections after the restoration of multiparty democracy, citizens also voted for opposition candidates (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 1996, 2001, 2016). However, in all general elections, CCM won presidential positions and many parliamentary and councillorship seats. Despite CCM dominance, opposition political parties' seats in the parliament and councils increased, but in the 2020 general elections, they lost lots of seats in those organs for various reasons (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2021). Apart from getting fewer votes, many opposition candidates were disqualified (Ulimwengu, 2023).

In all general elections, there have been complaints about their credibility. It is always argued that the government favours CCM (African Union, 2020; Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), 2020).

During the past general elections, especially in the campaign phase, there was violence in some places to varying degrees (African Union, 2020; EISA, 2020). The main causes of such violence were election irregularities and violation of election legislation (African Union, 2020; EISA, 2020; REDET, 2020; Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi, 2021). REDET stands for Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania. In some areas, the violence led to deaths, particularly in Tanzania and Zanzibar (EISA, 2020).

Based on the previous general election results, the registered political parties also have earned public trust to varying degrees (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2020; United Republic of Tanzania, 2016). The ruling party has a higher degree of trustworthiness than that of the opposition political parties, but CCM is not fully trustworthy (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 2021; United Republic of Tanzania, 2016). The opposition has earned little public trust because they have not covered the entire country, especially in the rural area (Bakari & Whitehead, 2013), and they have limited resources (Bakari & Whitehead, 2013; Legal and Human Rights Centre & Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation, 2016; Mashamba, 2023; United Republic of Tanzania, 2006). Also, they are not well-institutionalised (Whitehead, 2000), and they have lots of leadership issues (Howard, Sungusia, & Maro, 2004; Whitehead, 2000) such as highly personalised leadership (Whitehead, 2000), and internal conflicts (Howard et al., 2004; Magai, 2022; Mashamba, 2023; Mwakibete, 2022). For instance, there has been a conflict in Chadema about the 19 women special seat MPs (Citizen Reporter, 2022; Magai, 2022), and the split of CUF (Kabwe, 2022). CCM is not fully trustworthy because of issues related to government integrity like corruption (Mwakibete, 2022).

Theoretical framework and conceptual definitions

The theoretical framework throws light on the analysis and conceptual definitions and leads to the formulation of specific research questions. Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) theory guided this research because it is about the re-adoption of innovation - pluralism. DOI explains the process and factors influencing social change (Rogers, 2003). It is assumed that the innovation-decision process takes time and has stages like awareness-knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation for individual people (Rogers, 2003). For an organisation, stages are agenda-setting, matching, decision-making, restructuring or redefining, clarifying, and routinising (Rogers, 2003). Another assumption is that innovation features – relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability have effects on the adoption of innovation (Rogers, 2003). Also, individual features such as age, exposure, education, and income; network externalities like associations; and communication channels influence the adoption of the innovation (Rogers, 2003).

DOI is relevant in this research because, according to the debate on whether to re-adopt pluralism, the majority worried mainly about its compatibility, especially national unity, and peace.

The main concepts of this research are multipartism, violence, polarisation, trust, and re-adoption. Their meanings in the context of this study are as follows. Multipartism is a political system whereby there are more than one political party, and such political parties compete fairly during the general elections to lead the country (Gaffney, 1996; Muchler & Schmidt, 2020).

Violence means actions or words which are intended to hurt people (Cambridge University, 2019). This term represents unrest. Polarisation is an act of dividing people into completely opposing groups based on political opinions (Cambridge University, 2019). Trust is the expectation of someone to fulfil their needs and interests through the actions of others, which they cannot control and predict precisely (Carlin, 2014; Dodsworth & Cheeseman, 2020; Sztompka, 2000). Re-adoption is the re-acceptance of the discontinued innovation, in this case, it is the practice of pluralism (Rogers, 2003).

The general question is - has the preference of citizens for a single-party system changed after the re-adoption of pluralism in 1992? Specific research questions are: What is the degree of citizens' preference for political party systems between 2001 and 2022? To what extent, has pluralism affected national unity and peace during that period? And to what extent, have citizens trusted political parties in that period?

Methodology

As touched briefly in the introduction section, secondary data were used to answer research questions. They were collected using quantitative methodology (Afrobarometer, 2022). The method was a survey, while the technique was a questionnaire (Afrobarometer, 2022). The data were collected by Afrobarometer in collaboration with REPOA. Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that provides reliable data on African experiences and evaluations of democracy, governance, and quality of life (Afrobarometer, 2022). Nine survey rounds in up to 42 countries have been completed between 1999 and 2023 (Afrobarometer, 2022). Afrobarometer's national partners conduct face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice (Afrobarometer, 2022).

The Afrobarometer team interviewed nationally representative samples of between 1,200 and 2,400 adult citizens between 2001 and 2022 (Afrobarometer, 2022). Only Round two and three had a sample size of about 1,200 people (Afrobarometer, 2022). Samples of these sizes yield country-level results with margins of error of $\pm 3\%$ for 1,200 and $\pm 2\%$ for 2,400 at a 95% confidence level (Afrobarometer, 2022).

A multistage sampling technique was used to draw the samples from the population of adult Tanzanians (Afrobarometer, 2022). Census enumeration areas were used, and in each area, eight interviews were conducted (Afrobarometer, 2022). The systematic Sampling technique was used to select eight households and, in each household, a simple random selection was employed to select a respondent (Afrobarometer, 2022). The gender of respondents was selected in alternation (Afrobarometer, 2022).

Univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analyses were employed. The analysis was conducted using frequencies, and percentages. The chi-square test for goodness of fit was also used to compare the preference of citizens for a single political party system in 1991 and between 2001 and 2022. The Commission consulted citizens in 1991 and used content analysis, interview, and survey methods to collect the views of the people. According to the Commission's methodology and results matrices, they used a quota sampling technique to select 36,299 Tanzanians (United Republic of Tanzania, 1992). This approach is a non-random sampling technique (Neuman, 2014). It included all regions and districts, but in the rural area, only some villages were included (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 1992; United Republic of Tanzania, 1992). From abroad, Tanzanians in Tanzania embassies were involved (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 1992; United Republic of Tanzania, 1992). The categories were gender, age, occupation, and profession (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 1992). The age included even those under 18 (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania], 1992). Also, binary logistic regression was performed to examine factors which distinguish between single-party and multipartism systems preferences.


Independent variables, which were included in the model, especially non-demographics, were selected based on the reasons for preferring a single-party system in 1991. Such explanatory variables were violence, polarisation, and trust. The model was assessed based on the omnibus and Hosmer and Lemeshow tests, R square (Cox and Snell, and Nagelkerke), classification table, and leverage and studentized residuals (Field, 2013; Pallant, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014).

Results

The results are divided into sample characterisation, political party systems preference, political violence and polarisation, trust in political parties, and predictors of selecting multipartyism.

Respondents had various characteristics such as gender, age, and education (see Figure 1). On average, there were as many female respondents as their male counterparts. Moreover, half of respondents (50%) were youth, while two-fifths (41%) were aged between 36 and 60 years. About one in ten respondents (8%) was aged above 60 years. Again, one in ten respondents never went to school, while two-thirds had primary education. About a fifth of them had secondary education, and a handful of them (5%) attained formal education beyond the secondary education level. Finally, respondents who lived in a rural area (70%) were about two times more than those who lived in an urban setting (30%).


Figure 1. Averages of demographic features of respondents of Rounds 1 - 9



Source: Afrobarometer Data, 2001 - 2022

During the period, respondents showed their preferences for the political party system. Except for the 2005 survey, the majority preferred multipartyism to a single-party system (see Figure 2). In 2005, respondents who preferred pluralism were almost as many as those who preferred the single-party system. Between 2012 and 2022, the proportion of respondents who preferred pluralism gradually dropped, while that of those who did not gradually rose. Almost two-thirds of respondents preferred pluralism in both 2001 and 2022, while in 2012, three-quarters preferred it. Generally, during 2001-2022, two-thirds of respondents (68%) preferred multipartyism to a single-party system.


Figure 2. The overall degree of preference for a single political party system



Source: Afrobarometer, Data, 2001 - 2022

The strength of preference of pluralism differed across respondents as Figure 3 shows. For example, the proportion of respondents who preferred pluralism strongly dropped from 42% in 2001 to 24% in 2005. It rose to 52% in 2012. The strong preference slightly dropped between 2012 and 2017 and dropped again by 6% between 2017 and 2021, but it was still higher than that of 2001 by 8%. In 2022, it slightly rose again by 3%. The highest strength which hovered at 56% was in 2017. On the contrary, the strength of preference of a single-party system dropped between 2001 and 2005, and dropped again between 2005 and 2012, while it was maintained in 2017. It rose again by 10% between 2014 and 2022. When compared to the proportions in 2001, in 2022, the strength was low by 9%. The highest proportion of strength was in 2001 (28%), followed closely by the proportion in 2005 (26%). Also, it slightly rose by 3% between 2021 and 2022.

Figure 3. Strength of degree of preference of a single political party system



Source: Afrobarometer Data, 2001 - 2022

A crosstabulation analysis also showed that nearly two-thirds of respondents who were close to CCM (62%) did not prefer a single-party system to pluralism. In contrast, most respondents who were close to the opposition political parties (87%) did not choose the single-party system.

Further analysis showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the proportion of citizens favouring a single political party system identified in the current sample (32%) as compared with the value of 77% that was obtained in a 1991 Nyalali's Commission consultations (United Republic of Tanzania, 1992), $\chi^2 (1, n=17344) = 23853.873, p < .001$. As Table 2 depicts, the differences in 2003, 2012, 2014, and 2017 were big, while in 2001, 2005, and 2008 were somewhat small. Again, the smallest difference was in 2005 and the biggest

Table 2. Difference between Nyalali's Commission survey and Afrobarometer survey results


Year	Current sample %	Difference	χ^2	df	n	p-value
2001	40	37	1936.824	1	2043	<.001
2003	31	46	1578.748	1	1118	<.001
2005	52	25	539.086	1	1151	<.001
2008	36	41	1360.699	1	1166	<.001
2012	23	54	4444.936	1	2282	<.001
2014	23	54	4446.427	1	2300	<.001
2017	30	47	3483.579	1	2341	<.001
2021	33	44	3103.048	1	2334	<.001
2022	32	45	3219.108	1	2372	<.001

Source: Afrobarometer Data, 2001-2022

Similarly, from a different perspective, a trend showed that the proportion of respondents who cherished multipartyism increased. Moreover, between 2003 and 2022, averagely, slightly above two-thirds of respondents found that pluralism provides real choices of who to govern a nation. Again, in 2005 and 2014, the proportions dropped, but that of 2005 was higher than that of 2014. From 2017, it rose to slightly above three quarters (77%). During 2003 – 2022, the majority of respondents (72%) needed pluralism rather than a single-party system. Further analysis revealed that during 2003-2022, two-thirds of respondents close to CCM (67%) wanted pluralism, while most respondents close to the opposition (82%) wanted multipartism.

As political parties compete to lead a country, their competition may lead to violent conflicts and polarisation. The results showed that during 2003-2022, on average, three in four respondents (75%) thought the competition led to violent conflicts in varying degrees (see Figure 4). Further, in 2005, the proportion of respondents was the highest, while in 2012, it was the lowest. Their proportions increased in 2017 and slightly dropped in 2022. Some respondents viewed that such violent conflicts occur many times, while others thought they do on a few occasions. For example, the proportion of respondents who viewed that violent conflicts occur many times (29%) decreased gradually, and those who thought it happens rarely (41%) dropped slightly in 2005. It rose gradually between 2008 and 2014, and it dropped again in 2017. Between 2021 and 2022, there was a slight increase compared to that in 2017. In contrast, averagely, about one-fifth of respondents almost did not think political party competition leads to any violent conflicts. In 2003, 2005, and 2014, generally, the proportions were lower than those in 2008, 2012, 2017, and 2021. In 2022, it fell by 4% to 28% compared to those in 2021.


Figure 4. Respondents' views on political party competition and political violence



Source: Afrobarometer Data, 2001 - 2022

Concerning polarisation, the findings showed that between 2003 and 2022, on average, about one-third of respondents agreed that political parties create division and confusion therefore pluralism is unnecessary. The proportions were high in 2005 and 2014 and low in 2008, 2012, and 2017 (see Figure 5). In that period, the proportion of respondents dropped from 30% in 2003 to 22% in 2022. Moreover, on average, one in five respondents (18%) strongly agreed that political parties bring division and confusion in society. Furthermore, the highest proportion of respondents (31%) who agreed that political parties divide society was in 2005.


Figure 5. Views of respondents on society division due to pluralism



Source: Afrobarometer Data, 2001 -2022

As Figure 6 shows, during 2021 and 2022, on average, the results showed that one-third of respondents strongly liked their neighbours who supported different political parties. Moreover, about a quarter, to some extent, would like such neighbours. In contrast, slightly above one-tenth of respondents would not strongly like neighbours who were affiliated with different political parties, while close to another tenth to some extent would not. Furthermore, close to one-fifth of respondents would not care to live with the neighbours supporting different political parties.

Figure 6. Feelings of respondents about their neighbours supporting a different political party




Source: Afrobarometer Data, 2021 - 2022

Trust in political parties influences people’s preference for a party system. The results showed that on average, a simple majority of respondents (55%) trusted CCM a great deal, while close to one-fifth of respondents (17%) trusted the opposition parties combined. In all nine surveys, the proportions of respondents with trust in CCM were higher than those of respondents who trusted the opposition parties. Further, they dropped dramatically between Rounds four and six and rose again between Rounds six and eight. In Round nine, it dropped by 8% to 61%. The results also indicated that some respondents did not trust political parties fully. For example, the proportions of respondents who to some extent trusted CCM rose consecutively from the first survey to the sixth and dropped in the seventh and eighth Rounds consecutively (see Figure 7). It slightly rose in the ninth Round. In contrast, the proportion of respondents who somewhat trusted the opposition parties rose from 2005 after a slight fall in that year.

Some respondents did not trust political parties at all. On average, about one in ten respondents did not trust CCM, while close to one-third did not trust the opposition parties. From 2014, generally, the proportion of respondents who did not trust CCM decreased, while that of respondents who did not trust the opposition parties increased but dropped in 2022. Between 2014 and 2022, the proportion of respondents who somewhat trusted CCM and other political parties dropped, but those of the opposition parties were higher than those of CCM.

Figure 7. Respondents trust in political parties



Source: Afrobarometer Data, 2001 – 2022

Note. '2 per Mov. Avg' stands for Two per moving average

A further analysis showed that slightly less than one-third of respondents (30%) trusted only CCM, while a handful of them (7%) trusted only the opposition. Moreover, a simple majority of respondents (59%) trusted both CCM and the opposition political parties, while nearly none of the respondents trusted any political parties.

Another analysis was carried out to validate the previous analysis. Direct binary logistic regression was conducted to examine the impact of the selected predictors on the likelihood that respondents would prefer pluralism to a single-party system. In the model, the independent variables were closeness to political party, political parties divisive, political party competition leading to violence, trust in opposition political parties, and CCM. Other independent variables were attaining formal education, age, gender, and urban-rural location.

The model containing all predictors was statistically significant $\chi^2(9, N=10,250) = 2155.359, p < .001$, showing that the model was able to distinguish between respondents who favoured single party system and those who chose pluralism. The leverage statistic score was 0.000975, while all standardized residuals lay within ± 2.58 and only about 2% outside ± 1.96 . The model as a whole explained between 19% (Cox and Snell R Square) and 27% (Nagelkerke R Square) of the variance of choosing pluralism over a single-party system, and correctly classified 75% of cases.

As Table 3 shows, of all independent variables, only seven made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model (closeness to political party, political parties divisive, trust in CCM, trust in opposition political parties, location, gender, and education). The strongest predictor of preferring pluralism was the respondent's trust in the opposition, recording an odds ratio of 2.474. This indicated that respondents who trusted the opposition were over two times more likely to choose pluralism than those who did not trust them, controlling for other factors in the model.

Similarly, the odds ratio of 2.289 for closeness to political parties indicated that respondents close to the opposition were over two times more likely to choose pluralism than those who were close to CCM, controlling other factors in the model.

The odds ratio of 1.537 for gender also indicated that men were over one time more likely to choose pluralism than their women counterparts, considering all other factors in the model. Also, the odds ratio of 1.327 for attaining formal education showed that respondents with formal education were over one time more likely to prefer pluralism to a single-party system, controlling other factors in the model.

The odds ratios of .653, .224, and .798 for trust in CCM, political parties divisive and urban-rural location were less than 1. This shows that respondents who trusted CCM, viewed pluralism as divisive, and lived in rural areas, respectively were less likely to prefer a multiparty system.

Table 3. Logistic regression predicting the likelihood of preference for pluralism

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I. for EXP(B)	
							Lower	Upper
Closeness to Political party	.828	.083	100.337	1	<.001	2.289	1.947	2.692
Trust in CCM	-.427	.112	14.535	1	<.001	.653	.524	.813
Trust in the Opposition	.906	.050	326.152	1	<.001	2.474	2.242	2.729
Party competition leads to conflicts	-.033	.057	.328	1	.567	.968	.865	1.083
Political parties divisive	-1.498	.049	924.134	1	<.001	.224	.203	.246
Formal education	.283	.082	11.833	1	<.001	1.327	1.129	1.559
Gender	.430	.048	79.373	1	<.001	1.537	1.399	1.690
Urban or Rural	-.226	.053	18.047	1	<.001	.798	.719	.885
Respondent's age	-.051	.049	1.089	1	.297	.950	.863	1.046
Constant	.679	.155	19.118	1	<.001	1.972		

In summary, the analysis has provided answers to the specific research questions. The combination of analysis techniques and tests has also helped to get good analytical results.

Discussion

The discussion entails results summary, interpretation, limit, and an area for future research.

To summarise, the results are as follows. Firstly, between 2001 and 2022, the preference for pluralism has increased, while that of single party system has decreased compared to 1991 citizen consultation results. Two-thirds of respondents preferred multipartism to a single-party system. However, there were fluctuations between years within that period. Additionally, most respondents were close to political parties, but the majority were close to CCM, and of these, two-thirds favoured pluralism. However, respondents close to the opposition were over two times more likely to choose pluralism than those close to CCM.

Of four demographic features – age, education, gender, and location, three (education, gender, and location) were statistically significant and again, of these, education and gender had odds ratios above 1. These results indicated that respondents with formal education were over one times more likely to choose pluralism than those who did not. Similarly, male respondents were over one time more likely to choose pluralism than their female counterparts. Also, respondents who resided in rural areas were over one time less likely to choose multipartism than those who dwelled in the urban setting.

Secondly, most respondents reported that political violence has been occurring because of political party competition, but greatly, their frequency was moderate. Also, some respondents viewed that multipartism has divided people, and the frequency was the highest in 2005 but was below 50%, and over time it was dropping. Again, respondents who reported that pluralism divided society were over four times less likely to choose multipartism than those who reported that the practice was necessary. Again, during 2021 – 2022, a simple majority of respondents were happy to have neighbours who supported different political parties, while about one-fifth did not care.

Finally, between 2001 and 2022, the majority of respondents trusted political parties, for example, a simple majority trusted CCM and opposition parties. About one-third of respondents trusted only CCM, while nearly a tenth trusted only opposition parties. Moreover, respondents who trusted CCM were one and a half times less likely to favour pluralism, while those who trusted the opposition were over two times more likely to choose pluralism.

These findings suggest that since the restoration of pluralism, gradually adult Tanzanians have been re-accepting pluralism because the fear of civil strifes, civil wars, and national division has been waning. However, there are incidences of violence and divisions but not as intense as speculated in 1991, and there is social cohesion because the majority of people supporting different political parties live together peacefully. However, in 2005, it appears that the division and confusion were intense to the extent that the preference for pluralism dropped dramatically. Again, possibly, there were other factors which this research did not reveal due to its design. Additionally, about the first reason, the trust of some adult Tanzanians in the opposition political parties increased the number of citizens preferring pluralism to a mono-party system. Moreover, formal education has also contributed to that change because multipart democracy is taught at schools, colleges, and universities. Next, the urban setting has also influenced the change of the strong position held in 1991 possibly because the opposition political parties are somewhat well-established in the urban area.

As Karume and Kilimwiko (2020) argue, this research also suggests that the landslide victories of the ruling party in 2020 do not influence party system preference. They argue that there is no association between citizens' preference for a party system and the political party landslide victories.

Although the samples of Afrobarometer surveys are representative, the results of this study are not generalisable across space and time because of uncertainties.

Further research employing a qualitative approach is required to qualify the analysis of this study to get comprehensive knowledge on this phenomenon.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Multiparty democracy was introduced in Tanzania in the 1950s, and it was discontinued in the mid-1960s. Many international organisations, including the United Nations and powerful nations, have been promoting multiparty democracy. In the early 1990s, most adult Tanzanians (77%) who participated in the Nyalali Commission's consultations wanted a single-party system, but the government re-adopted pluralism because of domestic and international pressure. Since the re-adoption of multipartism, it is not well-known whether the number of citizens' preference for pluralism has surpassed that of those who preferred a single-party system in 1991.

This research was designed to examine again the rate of re-acceptance of multipartyism and factors contributing to such a degree. Afrobarometer surveys Round 1-9 data were analysed to answer the specific research questions, and DOI theory informed the analytical framework. The analysis showed that from 2001 – 2022, two-thirds of respondents preferred pluralism to a single-party system regardless of their closeness to political parties, especially CCM. However, respondents close to the opposition parties combined were more likely to reject a single-party system than those close to CCM. Moreover, respondents with formal education were more likely to accept pluralism than those without formal education. Likewise, men were more likely to accept pluralism than those women respondents. Also, rural dwellers were less likely to accept multipartism than those who lived in urban settings.

Results also showed that the majority of respondents reported that there were incidences of violence and divisions due to political party competition, but their frequencies were not high. The rise of such incidences and divisions possibly contributed to the fall in the proportion of respondents who preferred pluralism in 2005. Again, a simple majority trusted CCM and opposition political parties, but a bigger margin trusted CCM. Moreover, respondents who trusted CCM were less likely to accept pluralism than those who trusted the opposition.

The findings suggest that, to a greater extent, from 2001 to 2022, more citizens preferred pluralism than those who chose a single-party system in 1991. The main reason is that the fear that pluralism would cause civil strife and unrest has been waning because the opposition never won the presidency and civil wars have never happened. Additionally, the 2020 general elections CCM's landslide victory does not justify the discontinuation of pluralism.

These findings are not generalised across time because of uncertainties. Also, qualitative research is required to illustrate the findings of this research to get comprehensive knowledge about the preferences of citizens for the political party systems in Tanzania.

Because, in Tanzania, multiparty democracy is constitutional and considered a better government system than other systems, some actions need to be taken to enhance a high degree of its re-adoption. Key stakeholders to ensure re-adoption is successful are the central government, electoral management bodies, and political parties.

Firstly, the central and local government should put more emphasis on teaching multiparty democracy at all levels of formal education. Secondly, in collaboration with media houses, it should also establish more radio and TV programmes on democracy to educate the public on multiparty democracy.

Thirdly, the National Electoral Commission and Zanzibar Electoral Commission should improve the management of the entire electoral process to reduce irregularities, which sometimes lead to violence. This should also apply to the Local Government, as it manages the local elections.

Next, all political parties should refrain from using undue influence, especially during the local and general elections. Furthermore, as CCM does, other political parties should establish continuous functional branches up to the grassroots levels, especially in the rural areas to earn more trust. However, CCM manages it because it has more resources than other political parties do and has existed since the 1950s. Finally, CCM should educate people close to it about multiparty democracy.

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