The gap between national export premium and foreign-ownership premium is stronger in manufacturing firms as opposed to service sectors. Moreover, we find clear and strong productivity premia in size, training programmes and level of development in the manufacturing firms. In the services sector, these premia are always smaller and only significant for medium-sized firms. There is no difference in experience premium between sectors in terms of both significance and magnitude of the estimated coefficients.
Related Articles
Bargaining Strategies in recent tax reforms in Tanzania
The authors’ motivation for this research and so this Working Paper was on their conceptualisation of revenue bargaining as it hones in on political dynamics whereby the interests and power of members of government and of different revenue providers take center stage. A political settlement approach that conceptualises political dynamics fitting both democratic and non-democratic […]
The Demand and Supply of Political Campaign Financing in Tanzania and Uganda During the 2010s
Campaign financing is defined as money and other resources used by parties and candidates during primary, parliamentary, or presidential elections to secure nomination and election to political office. In this paper, we develop a demand-supply framework for analysing and understanding such financing in newly democratising poor countries, exemplified by Tanzania and Uganda. Like other African […]
Designing for differences:
aligning incentives in Tanzania’s skills sector
Since the introduction of the Skills Development Levy (SDL) in Tanzania, the financing of skills training has been contested. The private sector has raised concerns about the size of the levy and the usefulness of training provided by VET centres, and has accused the government of misallocation and misuse of the raised levy. Lack of […]
Designing for differences:aligning incentives in Tanzania’s skills sector
The aim of this paper is twofold. Building on Andreoni (2018), we first aim to evaluate the current incentive structures that cause existing inefficiencies and encourage rule-breaking behaviour. Second, we seek to test empirically a number of institutional design strategies for the sector that would better align the incentives of private- and public-sector stakeholders and […]